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Abstract
It is several years since national research evaluation systems around the globe started mak-
ing use of quantitative indicators to measure the performance of researchers. Nevertheless,
the effects on these systems on the behavior of the evaluated researchers are still largely
unknown. For investigating this topic, we propose a new inwardness indicator able to gauge
the degree of scientific self-referentiality of a country. Inwardness is defined as the propor-
tion of citations coming from the country over the total number of citations gathered by the
country. A comparative analysis of the trends for the G10 countries in the years 2000-2016
reveals a net increase of the Italian inwardness. Italy became, both globally and for a large
majority of the research fields, the country with the highest inwardness and the lowest rate
of international collaborations. The change in the Italian trend occurs in the years following
the introduction in 2011 of national regulations in which key passages of professional
careers are governed by bibliometric indicators. A most likely explanation of the peculiar Ital-
ian trend is a generalized strategic use of citations in the Italian scientific community, both in
the form of strategic author self-citations and of citation clubs. We argue that the Italian case
offers crucial insights on the constitutive effects of evaluation systems. As such, it could
become a paradigmatic case in the debate about the use of indicators in science-policy
contexts.
Introduction
Starting from the late 1980s, several European and extra-European countries implemented
national systems to monitor, assess, and evaluate the research performance of their scientific
workforce [1, 2]. One of the key features of such research evaluation systems is the focus on
quantitative indicators (metrics) as crucial science policy tools [3]. Accordingly, in the last
years, several scientometric indicators, based on publications or citations (or on a combination
of both, such as the h-index), have increasingly appeared in the academic evaluation systems,
alongside with the traditional peer-review-based procedures.
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The use of these indicators in the evaluation of research performance has generated a
heated debate in the scientific community. The advocates argue that scientometric measures
are not only more objective than the peer-review [4]; they would also improve both the quan-
tity and the quality of the scientific production [5, 6]. This would occur because the indicators
are integrated within a system of incentives that rewards the achievement of the scientometric
targets set by the evaluation system [7]. On the other hand, critics claim that the same mecha-
nisms that are designed to improve the research performance create at the same time room for
strategic behaviors [8]. For instance, when productivity is positively rewarded, the number of
publications become a goal that can be pursued not only by positive behaviors (doing more
research), but also by opportunistic strategies (e.g., slicing one scientific work into multiple
publications) [9, 10]. Analogously, when citations become a goal, the “citation game” starts
[11]. Criticisms themselves have been challenged: for instance, Butler’s conclusions about the
Australian case have been widely discussed [12]. A mediating position is represented by schol-
ars proposing a “responsible use” of metrics. According to this approach, research metrics can
provide valuable insights on the research performance, granted that they are carefully designed
in order to avoid unintended consequences. Thus, a distillation of best practices has been pro-
posed for improving the use of metrics in research assessment [13].
Recently, the idea that the consequences of the use of indicators on the behavior of
researchers can be easily sorted between the intended and the unintended ones, has been ques-
tioned as too simplistic [14, 15]. Instead, the notion of “constitutive effects” has been advanced
to capture the way in which the indicators act on the researchers [16]. Within this new frame-
work, indicators are conceived as shaping the activity of research deeply and at different levels,
from the citation habits to the research agenda, redefining at the same time key evaluative
terms such as research quality [17]. They become crucial actors in the “epistemic living spaces”
of academic researchers [18] and researchers begin to “think with indicators” pervasively [19].
The main constitutive effects of the indicators described in the literature can be grouped
into three main types: i) Goal-displacement: scoring high on the indicators becomes a target in
itself, that is to be achieved also by gaming the system [20, 21]; ii) Risk avoidance: highly inno-
vative, not mainstream, and interdisciplinary research topics are avoided because they could
do not score well on indicators that tend to reward more traditional research programmes [19,
22–26]; iii) Task reduction: when academic activities such as teaching and public engagement
are not rewarded, academics tend to avoid them to concentrate only on publishable academic
research [27–29].
Although these effects have been highly debated, until recently the evidence of their occur-
rence has been mainly anecdotal. It is only in the last years that the methodical empirical study
of such effects has been undertaken [14, 22]. In the present paper, we aim to advance the
knowledge on this topic by focusing on the case of Italy. Among European and extra-European
countries, Italy is the only one in which some key career passages of scientific researchers are
entirely regulated by rules based on bibliometric indicators (except for the scholars in the
Social Sciences and Humanities, see next section). Thus, Italy is ideally suited to studying the
response of researchers to the use of metrics in research evaluation.
In particular, we will investigate whether Italian scientists have pervasively adopted a strate-
gic use of citations in order to boost their indicators. By “pervasively”, we mean that the effect
of this behavior should be visible in the great majority of scientific fields, at the national level.
As we will highlight in the Conclusion, the Italian case provides important insights on the con-
stitutive effects of evaluation systems in general.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, the specificity of the
Italian case is explained and the literature dealing with self-citing strategic behaviors is
reviewed. Next, a new “inwardness” indicator is introduced that is sensitive to collective
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strategic citation behaviors at a country level. In the Data section, the procedure for retrieving
the data is described, while the main findings are presented in the Results section. In the Dis-
cussion, after examining alternative explanations, it is argued in favor of the emergence of a
collective strategic behavior devised to meet the demands of the evaluation system. In the Con-
clusions, some general lessons from the Italian case are drawn.
The Italian case
In 2010, the Italian university system underwent a wide process of reformation, regulated by
the Law 240/2010. The reform created the Agency for the Evaluation of the University and
Research (ANVUR), a centralized agency whose main task is the monitoring and the evalua-
tion of the Italian research system. The Agency started in 2011 a research assessment exercise
called VQR, relative to the period 2004-2010. A second research assessment exercise was
started in 2015, relative to the period 2011-2014. In both exercises, the evaluation of submitted
articles was largely based on the automatic or semi-automatic use of algorithms fed by citation
indicators [30] while other research outputs, such as books, were evaluated by peer reviews.
The reform modified also the recruitment and advancement system for university profes-
sors by introducing the National Scientific Habilitation (ASN). Both for hiring and promotion,
having obtained the ASN has become mandatory for applying to academic positions. The bib-
liometric rules rely on three indicators. For the hard sciences, life sciences, and engineering,
the indicators considered by ANVUR are the number of journal articles, the number of cita-
tions, and the h-index. For the social science and humanities, the indicators are the number of
research outputs, the number of monographs, and the number of papers published in “class
A” journals. At each new round of habilitation, ANVUR calculates for each of these indicators
the “bibliometric thresholds” that the candidates must overcome to achieve the ASN. For the
first edition of the ASN the national rules were defined in the Ministerial Decree 7 June 2012
n. 76. http://attiministeriali.miur.it/media/192901/dm_07_06_12_regolamento_abilitazione.
pdf. ANVUR defined the thresholds used for the first edition of the ASN: https://web.archive.
org/web/20190207112821/http://www.anvur.it/attivita/asn/asn-2012-2013/indicatori-e-
relative-mediane/. Candidates whose indicators do not overcome two thresholds out of three
cannot be habilitated (exceptions were possible in specific circumstances only in the first edi-
tion, ASN 2012). When first introduced, the thresholds were stated to be the median values of
the indicators of the permanent academic staff holding that position (associate or full profes-
sor). To make and example, in order to obtain a full professor habilitation, the candidate was
required to score better than half of the current full professors in two indicators out of three.
Applicants overcoming the fixed thresholds are then evaluated by a committee composed by
five referees who are in charge of the final decision about attributing habilitation.
Note that the focus on indicators is not confined to the national procedures but “trickles
down” to the university committees in charge of recruiting and promotion that are required to
take into account production and citation metrics when they evaluate and rank the habilitated
applicants. Finally, also the members of both the national habilitation and the local recruit-
ment committees are required to overcome bibliometric thresholds.
In sum, in Italy, starting from 2011, bibliometric indicators have gained a central role not
only in the national research assessment but in the entire body of the recruitment procedures. A
remarkable peculiarity of the Italian system is that the indicators based on citations, used both
in the habilitation procedure and in the research evaluation exercise, are calculated by including
self-citations. Thus, researchers can increase their indicators just by self-citing their own work.
Anecdotal evidence of the adoption of strategic behaviors in the form of author self-cita-
tions has been presented by Baccini [31]. Two recent studies have documented more
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thoroughly the rise of opportunistic behaviors in response to the ASN rules. Seeber et al. has
analyzed how the use of self-citations in four Italian research areas changed after the introduc-
tion of the habilitation procedure. They have found that scientists in need of meeting the
thresholds (i.e., those looking for habilitation as a prerequisite for tenure-track or promotion
to full professor) did increase significantly their self-citations after 2010 [32]. Scarpa et al.
focused on the Italian engineering area and found an anomalous peak in the self-citations rate
(i.e., the number of self-citations to the total number of citations) in correspondence of the sec-
ond round of the habilitation procedure, in 2013 [33]. Even if the aforementioned studies have
highlighted some recent behavior changes by Italian scientists, they did not address a subtler
form of strategic behavior, the one based on the so-called citation clubs or citation cartels.
Strategic behaviors, country self-citations, and the inwardness
indicator
A citation club is an informal structure in which citations are strategically exchanged among
its members to boost the respective citation scores [34–36]. Citation clubs are difficult to spot,
especially when their members exchange citations but are not co-authors. Indeed, if we only
examine the self-citation rates of the individual members, we would not spot any anomaly, in
so far as they keep their individual self-citations under control (i.e., they do not cite dispropor-
tionately their own work). Thus, a well-concealed citation club is invisible if monitoring is lim-
ited to individual self-citations [37, 38]. If we consider a group of scholars, the citation club
becomes visible as it increases the citation traffic internal to the group (group self-citations).
Obviously, groups of scholars may be individuated in many ways and in different social net-
works. A most natural example may be a group of scholars that are not directly co-authors but
at a relatively small distance in a co-authorship network. However, a citation club may also
thrive on an interlocking editorship network [39, 40], in which case citations are exchanged
between scholars serving as editors in the same set of journals. Or, again, the citation club may
be rooted at an institutional level (universities or departments). In all these cases, although it is
possible to record the citation traffic inside the citation club, it is nonetheless impossible to dis-
tinguish the citations generated as a normal by-product of the research activity from those
resulting from strategic behaviours.
Along this rationale, the key idea of this paper is that a sudden and strong increase of strate-
gic citations internal to a country is going to affect in a visible way self-citations recorded at
country level. Such occurrence may be spotted by a macro level analysis, without the need of
documenting the existence of clubs, whatever defined, and of a criterion to distinguish
between types of citations. Hence, hereafter the focus is on country self-citations, a not much
studied form of self-citation [41]
A country self-citation occurs whenever the set of the countries of the authors of the citing
publication and the set of the countries of the authors of the cited publication are not disjoint,
that is, if these two sets share at least one country [42, 43]. Notably, any citation exchanged
within a citation club formed by researchers working in the same country is counted as coun-
try self-citations, even when it is not an author self-citation.
Thus, considering that most of the standard author self-citations are country self-citations
too (the only exception being authors that changed their country between the citing and the
cited publication), by analyzing the country self-citations, we can capture both the “classic”
strategy based on author self-citations, and the “elaborated” one based on citation clubs.
It is very important to underline that country self-citations are not always generated by cita-
tion clubs, just as not all author self-citations originate from gaming purposes. The literature
on author self-citations agrees on the fact that a certain amount of them is a normal byproduct
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of the scientific communication. There are many perfectly legitimate reasons for citing one’s
own works, such as building on previously obtained results, avoiding repetition, and so on
[44–46]. By the same token, it is normal that a country has an internal exchange of citations
amongst its researchers insofar the knowledge produced by the country is used (i.e., cited) by
the same country’s scientific staff. Moreover, in the research fields that are characterized by a
national focus (e.g., some areas in the Social Science and Humanities), it is normal to expect a
larger number of country self-citations.
Consider also that international collaboration positively affects the number of country self-
citations. In fact, the more a country collaborates with other countries, the higher will be the
number of country self-citations. Take for instance a paper authored in collaboration by Italy
and France. Any future citation to that paper coming from an Italian-authored or a French-
authored publication will count as a country self-citation for both Italy and France, since the
citing and the cited publication will share at least one country of affiliation.
In sum, the country self-citations are not per se a sign of strategic behavior. The level of self-
citations of a country depends both on the internal exchange of knowledge within a country
and the amount of international collaboration. Nonetheless, if the researchers of a single coun-
try initiate strategic behaviors in order to boost their citations, this is likely to produce an
anomalous increase of country self-citations compared to the other countries. Thus, to detect
the strategic behaviors, one has to focus on the changes in the country self-citations over time,
rather than on their absolute value.
In order to obtain a normalized measure of country self-citations, we introduce a simple
indicator of “inwardness”. For a given year and a country c, the inwardness is defined as the
percentage ratio between the total number of country self-citations (Sc) and the total number
of citations (Cc) of that country:
Ic ¼
Sc
Cc
� 100 ð1Þ
The minimum value of the inwardness indicator is Ic = 0 when a country has no self-citations;
and the maximum is Ic = 100 when a country has self-citations only, that is Sc = Cc.
It is easy to show that the inwardness indicator is a variant of the Relative Citation Impact
(RCI) of a country. The RCI is defined by May [47] as the ratio between the average citation
per paper of a country and the average citation per paper of the world (see also [48]). The RCI
of the country c in a given year is defined as RCIc ¼
Cc
Pc
�
Pw
Cw
where Cc and Cw are the total
number of citations of the country and of the world, and Pc and Pw the publications of the
country and of the world. The total number of citations is the sum of the country self-citations
(Sc) and the external citation (Xc); when the world is considered Cw = Sw, since obviously Xw =
0. If a Relative Self-citation Impact is defined as RSIc ¼
Sc
Pc
�
Pw
Sw
, the inwardness indicator can
be expressed as
Ic ¼
RSIc
RCIc
¼
Sc
Pc
Sw
Pw
0
B
B
@
1
C
C
A�
Cw
Pw
Cc
Pc
0
B
B
@
1
C
C
A ¼
Sc
Cc
ð2Þ
Note that the inwardness indicator is normalized for the size of the country in terms of
publications.
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From a conceptual point of view, the inwardness of a country is an indicator of how much
the knowledge produced in the form of scientific publications in a given year in a country
flows, through citations, into the knowledge produced in that country in the following years
[49–51]. Indeed, 1 − Ic indicates how much of the knowledge produced in a year in a country
flows, through citations, into the knowledge (publications) produced by other countries [52,
53]. A higher level of inwardness suggests that the knowledge produced by a country attracts
mainly the interest of the national community. By contrast, a lower level suggests that the
research of the country does not remain confined within its own borders but flows also toward
the rest of the world. It is important to stress that the inwardness, as such, has not an evaluative
connotation. The inwardness is a descriptive measure of the self-referentiality of a country in a
certain research area. It serves to provide a quantitative indicator of a phenomenon (the self-
referentiality), not to judge it.
As said above, the strategic use of citations, both as author self-citations and as citation
clubs, affects the country self-citations and, hence, also the inwardness indicator. The start of a
strategic use of citations at the country level should therefore be associated with an anomalous
rise of the inwardness indicator.
Recall, however, that inwardness is positively affected also by increases of international col-
laboration. It is therefore necessary to control the trend of the international collaboration
before concluding that an inwardness rise is due to strategic behaviors and not to an increase
of international collaboration.
Data
We retrieved the data for calculating the Inwardness indicator from SCIval, an Elsevier’s
owned platform powered by Scopus data (https://www.scival.com/home). The data were
exported from SCIval on October 16, 2018. They correspond to the last update on Scopus of
September 21, 2018. Data were retrieved in compliance with the terms of service of SCIval.
In particular, we exported from SCIval two metrics: (1) Citation Count including self-cita-
tions, and (2) Citation Count excluding self-citations. For both metrics, we included articles,
reviews, and conference papers, leaving aside other types of publications. The first Citation
Count metrics represents the countries’ total number of citations, whereas the countries’ num-
ber of self-citations was obtained as the difference between (1) and (2). Note that the SCIval’s
definition is binary and non-fractional: a citation can either be a self-citation or not [54]. The
weight of a country self-citation remains always 1, irrespective of the number of countries pro-
ducing the citing or the cited publications: if an Italian publication is cited by another Italian
publication, this self-citation will have the same weight as if the same publication was cited by
an international Italo-French-Chinese publication.
We retrieved the data for the G10 countries (Belgium-BE, Canada-CA, France-FR, Ger-
many-DE, Italy-IT, Japan-JP, the Netherlands-NL, Sweden-SE, Switzerland-CH, United King-
dom-GB, United States-US). In the years 2000-2016, the output of these countries
corresponded to 61.2% of the world output and they collected 95% of world citations. In order
to study the spread of the strategic behavior in different research areas, data were exported for
all the Scopus fields aggregated, i.e., without any filter for subject area, and for each of the 27
Scopus Main Categories (total number of datasets = 28), for the years 2000-2016 included. In
order to account for the effect of international collaboration on the inwardness indicators, we
retrieved from SCIval also the Percentage of International Collaboration metric for the target
countries. The percentage of international collaboration for a country in a given year is defined
as the share of publications of the country coauthored by at least one different country. The
graphs were implemented in R by using the package “ggplot2” [55].
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Results
Fig 1 shows the trend of the inwardness over time for the eleven target countries (all Scopus
fields aggregated). All countries share a rather similar profile with apparent differences in the
absolute value. The ranking is partially explained by the size of the scientific production of the
countries. Countries with a large scientific output, such as the Unites States, naturally attract
more citations from their own production, simply because they have more citing and citable
articles than smaller countries such as Belgium. For all the countries under analysis, not only
the inwardness increases slowly and regularly over time, but the yearly ranks of countries
according to their inwardness are remarkably stable.
In this landscape, Italy stands out as a notable exception. In 2000, at the beginning of the
period, Italy has an inwardness of 20.62% and ranks sixth, just behind UK. In 2016, at the end
of the period, Italy ranks second, with an inwardness of 30.73%. Note that, until 2009, Italy’s
inwardness grows parallel to those of comparable countries (UK, Germany, France). However,
around 2010, the Italian trend shows a sudden acceleration. In the following six years, Italy
overcomes UK, Germany, and Japan, becoming the first European country and the second
one in the G10 group.
Table 1 shows the variations (deltas) of the inwardness for each country, for the whole
period and by considering two sub-periods, 2008-2000 and 2016-2008. Note that in the first
period, Italy’s increase is in line with other countries, while in the second period (2008-2016),
Italy’s exhibits the largest inwardness delta: 8.29 p.p., more than 4 p.p. above the G10 average
and almost 3 p.p. above Germany. As a result, Italy is by far the country with the highest
inwardness delta also in the whole period 2000-2016 (10.11 p.p. vs 5.22 of the G10 average).
However, as already said, inwardness is affected by the amount of International Collabora-
tion of a country. In order to allow for this effect, in Fig 2, inwardness is plotted against the
average international collaboration score of each country. More precisely, inwardness at year
Y is plotted against the three-years moving average value of international collaboration calcu-
lated starting from year Y. In fact inwardness at year Y depends also on citations coming from
publications appeared in the following years [56].
The data shows indeed a positive relation between the two variables: for all the countries,
inwardness grows with the average international collaboration. The plot shows a peculiar tra-
jectory for Italy. Although for most years Italy ranks last in Europe for international collabora-
tion (x-axis), nevertheless, at the end of the period, it is the first European country for
inwardness (y-axis). Before 2010, Italy is close to and moves together with a group of three
European countries, namely Germany, UK, and France. Starting from 2010, Italy departs from
the group along a steep trajectory, to eventually become the European country with the lowest
international collaboration and the highest inwardness.
Until now, we focused on the aggregated output of the target countries, without considering
the different research areas (Scopus Main Categories). In order to investigate whether and
how inwardness changes across research areas, we calculated the inwardness time series for
each of the 27 Scopus Main Categories. The time series, as well as the scatterplots of the
inwardness against the international collaboration, are fully provided in the Supplementary
Materials. For reasons of space, these data are summarized in Fig 3, where the variation of the
inwardness indicator in the periods 2000-2008 (A) and 2008-2016 (B) is displayed for each of
the 27 Scopus Categories. Italy shows a remarkable difference between the two periods. In the
first one (Fig 3A), before the university reform, Italy is in line with the other G10 countries in
most of the research fields. In the second period, after the reform (Fig 3B), Italy stands out
with the highest inwardness increase in 23 out of 27 fields. The only exceptions are earth and
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planetary sciences (EPS), multidisciplinary (MUL), nursing (NUR), and physics and astron-
omy (PA).
As we show in the Supplementary Information (S1 Fig, 1-27), the inwardness increase is
not matched by a parallel increase of the international collaboration at the field level. In partic-
ular, at the end of the period, Italy is the European country with the lowest level of interna-
tional collaboration and the highest value of inwardness in the following Scopus Categories
(11 on 27): agricultural and biological sciences (ABS), biochemistry, genetics and molecular
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Fig 1. Inwardness for G10 countries (2000-2016). Source: elaboration on SCIval data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221212.g001
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biology (BGMB), chemical engineering (CE), economics, econometrics and finance (EEF),
earth and planetary sciences (EPS), environmental science (ES), immunology and microbiol-
ogy (IM), pharmacology, toxicology and pharmaceutics (PTP), veterinary (VET). In other 9
Categories, Italy is first for inwardness but not the lowest for international collaboration: busi-
ness, management and accounting (BMA), computer science (CS), dentistry (DEN), decision
sciences (DS), engineering (ENG), health professions (HP), mathematics (MAT), materials sci-
ence (MS), psychology (PSY). Note that the Italian production in the arts and humanities
(AH) and social sciences (SOC) is only partially covered by Scopus as a large part is published
in books and in the national language. Therefore, the results about these scholarly areas should
be taken with great caution [57].
Discussion
As seen from Fig 1 and Table 1, Italy shows a different trend compared to the other G10 coun-
tries. The comparative analysis of the inwardness indicator showed that Italian research grew
in insularity in the years after the adoption of the new rules of evaluation. While the level of
international collaboration remained stable and comparatively low, the research produced in
the country tended to be increasingly cited by papers authored by at least an Italian scholar.
The anomalous trend of the inwardness indicator detected at the macro level can be
explained by a generalized change in micro-behaviours of Italian researchers induced by the
introduction of bibliometric thresholds in the national regulations for recruitment and career
advancement. Indeed, in 2011 research and careers evaluation were revolutionized by the
introduction of quantitative criteria in which citations played a central role. In particular, cita-
tions started being rewarded in the recruiting and habilitation mechanisms, regardless of their
source. This created an incentive to inflate those citation scores by means of strategic behav-
iors, such as opportunistic self-citations and the creation of citation clubs.
A possible objection to the above explanation is that, in order to postulate individual and
collective behaviors, the collection of evidence at the micro level is an indispensable step.
According to this objection, unless you draw on co-authorship networks, you should avoid
talking about citations clubs, citations cartels, and citation gaming. Evidence, for instance,
could be searched by checking the existence of groups of researchers frequently exchanging
citations, that are not directly co-authors but at a relatively small distance in a co-authorship
Table 1. Inwardness delta. Delta is calculated as simple difference (p.p.) between the inwardness in the last and the
first year of the period.
Country Δ1 (2000-2008) Δ2 (2008-2016) Δtot (2000-2016)
Belgium 1.42 3.29 4.72
Canada 1.04 3.43 4.46
France 1.57 2.68 4.25
Germany 1.69 5.47 7.17
Italy 1.82 8.29 10.11
Japan 0.6 3.2 3.81
Netherlands 2 3.54 5.54
Sweden 0.94 3.32 4.27
Switzerland 0.94 3.32 4.27
United Kingdom 1.45 4.4 5.85
United States 0.14 2.87 3.01
Mean G10 countries 1.24 3.98 5.22
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221212.t001
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network. Without this kind of micro level analysis, one could just record the increase of
inwardness as a response to the reformation of the Italian reward system, but should not haz-
ard an explanation at the micro level.
As a matter of fact, a simple argument, based on set theory, shows that the above objection
is unduly conservative. The set C of the country self-citations is the union of two sets (C = A [
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Fig 2. Inwardness versus average international collaboration for the G10 countries. The average international collaboration is the 3-year
moving average calculated starting from the considered year. The international collaboration is defined as the share of publications of a country
coauthored by at least a coauthor of a different country. Source: elaboration from SCIval data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221212.g002
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Fig 3. Inwardness delta in Scopus Main Categories in the periods 2000-2008 (A) and 2008-2016 (B).
ABS = Agricultural and Biological Sciences, AH = Arts and Humanities, BGMB = Biochemistry, Genetics and
Molecular Biology, BMA = Business, Management and Accounting, CE = Chemical Engineering, CHEM = Chemistry,
CS = Computer Science, DEN = Dentistry, DS = Decision Sciences, E = Energy, EEF = Economics, Econometrics and
Finance, ENG = Engineering, EPS = Earth and Planetary Sciences, ES = Environmental Science, HP = Health
Professions, IM = Immunology and Microbiology, MAT = Mathematics, MED = Medicine, MS = Materials Science,
MUL = Multidisciplinary, NEU = Neuroscience, NUR = Nursing, PA = Physics and Astronomy, PSY = Psychology,
PTP = Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceutics, SOC = Social Sciences, VET = Veterinary. Source: elaboration
from SCIval data.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221212.g003
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B): the self-citations A generated by country-based researchers as a normal byproduct of the
research activity and the self-citations B resulting from strategic activities, including both
opportunistic self-citation and country-based citation clubs. Put in other words, the set A is
the “physiological” quota of country self-citations, whereas B is the “pathological” quota. An
increase of the inwardness indicator is, by definition, an increase of the cardinality of the set C
of the country self-citations. There are two possible explanations for that increase: (i) the cardi-
nality of A has increased, i.e. the physiological quota A of country self-citations has increased;
or (ii) the cardinality of B has increased, i.e. the pathological quota B of country self-citations
has increased.
Two explanations for an increase of cardinality of physiological quota A could be advanced.
According to the first one, internationalization, the increase may be due to a sudden rise, after
2009, of the amount of international collaborations of Italian scholars. In fact, we have already
observed that, other things left unchanged, an increase of international collaboration positively
affects the inwardness indicator. However, Fig 2 rules out this explanation. No peculiar
increase in the Italian international collaboration can be spotted.
The second explanation, specialization, is a narrowing of the scientific focus of Italian
researchers, i.e. a dynamic of scientific specialization leading to the growth of author self-cita-
tions [32]. The idea is that focusing on narrower topics results in a contraction of the scientific
community of reference. Thus, the number of citable papers would diminish and the chances
for author self-citation would correspondingly increase, generating also the growth of the
country self-citations. Although we do not have direct evidence falsifying the specialization
hypothesis, nonetheless, this explanation appears largely implausible. Indeed, it implies that
Italian researchers in all fields suddenly narrowed their focus to topics mainly investigated in
the national community. This sudden change would be not only peculiar of Italy, but also so
strong as to make the Italian inwardness diverge from those of the other G10 countries. Nota-
bly, Fig 3 shows that the Italian post-2008 acceleration is visible in most of the research areas.
Not only the change has been widespread, regarding most research fields, but in some of them,
such as engineering (ENG), mathematics (MAT) or veterinary (VET), the increase reached
outstanding proportions. In any case, it would still be necessary to explain why a physiological
specialization occurred only in Italy and at the same time as the adoption of new rules for
evaluation.
Summing up, we have no plausible reasons in favor of a notable change in the physiological
quota A of country self-citations, sufficient to explain the anomalous boost of inwardness with
respect to the other G10 countries. Recalling that C = A [ B, the only alternative explanation
of the change in the cardinality of C is a notable expansion of the pathological set B of country
self-citations, i.e., an increase of author self-citations and an increase of citations exchanged
within citation-clubs formed by Italian scholars, aimed at boosting bibliometric indicators set
by ANVUR.
The slight discrepancy between the starting year of the inwardness acceleration and the
launch of bibliometric evaluation system, with the former occurring slightly earlier than the
latter, is easily explained by the “backward effect” typical of citation measures. Any change in
the citation habits taking place in a given year produces a backward effect on the citation
scores of the previous years because researchers cite previously published papers, so that the
change reverberates also on the citation scores of the past production. Citations received by
the most recent articles have a more lasting effect in the calculations of forthcoming indicators.
It is therefore more convenient to self-cite one’s own recent production rather than the remote
one. Hence, a strategic reaction to rules introduced in year 2011 is expected to produce an
inwardness acceleration that starts a few years before, just as observed for Italy.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we contributed to the empirical study of the constitutive effects that indicator-
based research evaluation systems have on the behavior of the evaluated researchers. By focus-
ing on the Italian case, we investigated how the Italian scientific community responded, at the
national level, to the introduction of a research evaluation system, in which bibliometric indi-
cators play a crucial role. Our results show that the behavior of Italian researchers has indeed
changed after the introduction of the evaluation system following the 2010 university reform.
Such a change is visible at a national scale in most of the scientific fields. The comparative analy-
sis of the inwardness indicator showed that Italian research grew in insularity in the years after
the adoption of the new rules of evaluation. While the level of international collaboration
remained stable and comparatively low, the research produced in the country tended to be
increasingly cited by papers authored by at least an Italian scholar.
We explained this as the result of the pervasively adoption of strategic citation behaviors
within the Italian scientific community. Even if they escape a direct observation, we argue that
such behaviors are the most likely explanation of the peculiar trend exhibited by the Italian
inwardness. This because our indicator was especially designed to be sensible to the effects of
both the opportunistic use of author self-citation and the creation of citation clubs.
We believe that three main lessons can be derived from the Italian case. Firstly, our results
support the claim that scientists are quickly responsive to the system of incentives in which they
act [32]. Thus, any policy aiming at introducing or modifying such a system should be
designed and implemented very carefully. In particular, considerable attention should be
placed on the constitutive effects of bibliometric indicators. They are not neutral measures of
performance but actively interact and quickly shape the behavior of the evaluated researchers.
Secondly, our results show that the “responsible use” of metrics would not be enough to
prevent the emergence of strategic behaviors. For instance, the Leiden Manifesto recommends
the use of a “suite of indicators” instead of a single one as a way to prevent gaming and goal
displacement (see the principle number 9 in [13]). The Italian case shows that, even if the
researchers are evaluated against multiple indicators, as recommended, strategic behaviors
manifest themselves anyway.
Lastly, our results prompt some reflections on the viability of the mixed evaluation systems,
in which the indicators are intended for complementing or integrating the expert judgment
expressed by the peer review. In fact, the Italian system was designed in principle according to
such a mixed approach, both for the research assessment exercises where research products
were evaluated by bibliometric indicators or by peer reviewers, and for the ASN where to over-
come bibliometric thresholds is but a necessary condition for being admitted to the final evalu-
ation by habilitation committees. Nonetheless, our results show that the mere presence of
bibliometric indicators in the evaluative procedures is enough to structurally affect the behav-
ior of the scientists, fostering opportunistic strategies. Therefore, there is the concrete risk that
in mixed evaluation systems, the indicator-based component overcomes the peer review-based
one. Hence, they de facto collapse to indicator-centric approaches. We believe that further
research is needed to better understand and fully appreciate the possibility of such a collapse.
In the meantime, we suggest that policy makers should exercise the most extreme caution in
the use of indicators in science policy contexts.
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